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1. Introduction 
Since the 1960s an important paradigm shift in science can be observed regarding our 
understanding of ecology, how it works, its complexity and dynamic internal and external 
relationships. These external relationships refer to what our natural environment and the 
ecosystems surrounding us mean for society. Parallel to the development of ecological system 
dynamics, increasing attention was also being paid to the co-evolution of natural and human 
systems in environmental and ecological economics. Take for example the work of Buzz 
Holling, an important natural scientist from the University of British Columbia in Canada who 
introduced the concept of functional response in population ecology and other intriguing ideas 
such as ecosystem resilience and adaptive capacity. 
 
The way this was conceptualized and operationalized was through the functional performance of 
ecosystems. Humanity needs ecological systems, ecosystems in short, to survive. The organic 
and anorganic components and processes within ecosystems provide functions, which benefit 
human beings through the social and economically valuable ‘goods and services’ these 
biophysical functions provide. Examples include clean drinking water and food needed for 
humanity to survive, but also less obvious goods and services perhaps such as human health 
protection as a result of clean air, climate regulation and UV filtering by our ozone layer.  
 
In the Netherlands Roefie Hueting was in the 1970s one of the first Dutch economists to point 
out the economic value of such functions based on what he referred to as functional scarcity. I’m 
grateful for having had the opportunity to work with him just before he retired and I just started 
as a freshman in this specific academic domain fifteen years ago. He wrote one of the first papers 
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in the Netherlands on the topic with the title ‘Functions of Nature’ in 1969. He further elaborated 
the idea in his PhD published in English in 1980 under the title ‘New Scarcity and Economic 
Growth, More Welfare through Less Production’ [1]. One of his students was Dolf de Groot, 
now at Wageningen University, who wrote his PhD 12 years later on the same topic from a more 
ecological perspective also titled ‘Functions of Nature’ [2].  
 
The basic idea behind ecosystem functions providing ecosystem services is simple and appealing 
from an economic point of view as it reduces the issue to a question of supply and demand. The 
environment supplies through its functionality goods and services which are in demand by 
human beings. We need clean water, air and food, all provided ‘free of charge’ by our planet, but 
also value nature as a place to enjoy recreational activities, find inspiration, and feel good, 
knowing that there is a place for wildlife with which we co-exist on this planet.  
 
If demand for these goods and services is higher than supply and becomes competitive for the 
limited available goods and services, there is scarcity. This competing demand strips down the 
issue of sustainable environmental management, meeting demand now and in the future and 
carefully balancing social, economic and ecologic interests at the same time, to a fundamental 
economic question. This idea goes back to theories of classical economists like Thomas Malthus 
and David Ricardo in the 18th century who expressed their concerns about the limited availability 
of one of the first natural resources considered in economic thinking, namely land for 
agricultural production. Malthus was primarily concerned about absolute scarcity of land, so the 
available amount of land, while Ricardo thought it would be the quality of the natural resource 
land that imposes limits to economic growth. 
5 

Even though there exists no market for many ecosystem services where they are traded as a 
result of supply and demand, they do have value and are not really ‘free of charge’ or ‘cost-free’ 
so to say, as there are almost always opportunity costs involved. For instance, their current use is 
at the expense of their future use as is the case for non-renewable energy resources such as oil 
and gas, or their use by one particular group is at the expense of another group of people as is the 
case when we have overcrowded common pool resources like natural parks or beaches, or 
discharge wastewater in a river impairing recreational fishing opportunities. 
 
The trade-off between economic development on the one hand and environmental conservation 
on the other hand based on an assessment of the supply and demand of ecosystem goods and 
services is nowadays generally accepted by both natural and social scientists. In the natural 
sciences important research questions relate to improving our understanding of the bio-
geochemical structure and processes underlying ecosystem functions. For example, what is the 
role of biodiversity in ecosystem processes, how do nitrogen cycles induce environmental 
change and affect the provision and quality level of ecosystem services. 
 
In the social science domain and then particularly in economics, the trade-offs mentioned here 
are also accepted in the two main strands of ‘environmental economics’ and ‘ecological 
economics’. In the social science domain the question is more one of ideology, i.e. whether one 
believes that the economy is a subset of the ecosystem as is the case in ecological economics, or 
the other way around that natural capital is a subset of the human economic system, which is 
usually the overall approach and assumption in environmental economics. In practice, however, 
both strands of thought apply similar economic valuation and evaluation methods focusing on 
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the same ecosystem goods and services. In the ecological economics literature perhaps more 
attention is paid to the underlying biophysical characteristics of the ecosystem providing the 
goods and services than in the environmental economics literature, and more use is made of 
evaluation tools like multi-criteria analysis. Ecological economists tend to claim to be more aware 
of the limits to economic growth and the extent to which natural capital can be replaced by man-
made capital. They prefer to work (more) with safe minimum standards and the precautionary 
principle. 
 
Valuation of the environment, the name of the chair to which I have been appointed last year, 
plays an important role in both strands of academic thinking and research. Economic monetary 
valuation is not always considered a plausible or realistic option by ecological economists. 
Environmental valuation to inform policy and decision-making, especially with the help of so-
called stated preference research methods, is often considered too restrictive, narrow, and simple 
by ecological and institutional economists to properly describe (1) the environmental values 
people hold, (2) the process of value construction or (3) the way individual values are aggregated 
into a social value. Stated preference methods simulate market behavior to capture the public 
value of ecosystem services and have their roots in neoclassical economic theory based on the 
assumption of individual utility maximization. However, here too the academic debate is 
sometimes somewhat blurred by subjective beliefs about how policy and decision-making should 
be organized and informed based on more participatory approaches, including for example 
citizens’ juries. In some of my early work published in journals such as Environmental Values 
and Ecological Economics I argued for combinations of the two and showed that the two do not 
necessarily bite and can go hand in hand [3,4]. 
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In the context of ecosystem services valuation and payments for ecosystem services, one of the 
greatest challenges is to link the natural and social sciences. That is, the intermediary platform 
between the ecological and economic system, specified and measured in terms of changes in the 
provision of valuable environmental goods and services. It is relatively easy to qualify these 
goods and services and come up with generic lists like the Millenium Ecosystem Assessment or the 
one presented in Table 1 taken from the AQUAMONEY guidelines, a project I coordinated for 
the European Commission.  
 
Table 1: Example of aquatic ecosystem functions and their goods and services 
 
Source: Brouwer et al. (2010). 
 
It is however difficult to specifically measure and quantify how changes in ecosystem 
performance affect the amount and quality of ecosystem good and service provision. These 
cause-effect relationships are often surrounded by tremendous uncertainty and therefore 
simplifying assumptions have to be made in order to be able to say anything at all about the 
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expected impacts of, for example, reduced nutrient runoff from land upstream on water quality 
improvements downstream. It is also difficult because these impacts are measured by scientists 
in units like milligrams of nitrogen per liter, which then still have to be linked somehow to a 
variety of goods and services. Examples include the change in fish stock and recreational fishing 
opportunities, and the corresponding increase in the number of days a fisherman can go out 
fishing or the likelihood a fisherman will catch a specific fish species (catch rate). It is this latter 
kind of information that is used by environmental economists to value the recreational impacts of 
water quality improvements and it is this kind of information that is often not available. 
 
In the European research project AQUAMONEY an attempt was made to create such a link for a 
number of water quality problems through the creation of so-called water quality ladders. These 
ladders display improved water quality levels on the one hand and their implications for a variety 
of water goods and services on the other hand. Spatial maps were used in case studies to test 
these quality ladders, where different colors of rivers indicated different water quality levels and 
corresponding water services. Although these maps and water quality ladders came about in 
close collaboration with ecologists, they were still based on assumptions about what would likely 
happen if water quality would improve to a certain level.  
 
In order to be able to analyze the socio-economic value of for instance water quality 
improvements, one needs to know how these quality improvements affect ecosystem goods and 
services. And this remains a big puzzle despite decades of research and the recent popularity of 
payments for ecosystem services. In some cases we merely have some rough indication of what 
we think we are valuing in terms of ecosystem goods and services. This includes the impact of 
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setting land aside upstream to reduce water quantity and quality problems downstream in many 
Payments for Ecosystem Services schemes. 
 
2. Ecosystem services valuation 
Economic valuation of the environment traditionally serves a number of purposes, including 
raising awareness. The fact that ecosystems provide goods and services, which have economic 
value, was given an enormous impetus in 1997 with the publication of the (in)famous paper in 
Nature by Robert Costanza and colleagues, some of whom economist, but most with a 
background in ecology and environmental sciences [5]. They suggested based on their 
calculations that the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital, most of which are not traded 
in economic market systems, are worth almost twice the value of the world’s gross national 
product. Although these estimates were surrounded by enormous uncertainty, the authors were 
nevertheless able to pin down this uncertainty to a value range between 16 and 54 trillion dollars 
per year, so say 50% more or less the estimated average of 33 trillion dollars. Ecosystem services 
provided by water and wetlands were among the most valuable assets on this planet according to 
this study, followed by tropical forests. 
 
The paper evoked a lot of criticism, for instance in a special issue one year later in the journal 
Ecological Economics to which I contributed in a modest way with my colleagues then from 
CSERGE in the UK Kerry Turner and Neil Adger [6]. Although the paper was said by some of 
the authors to primarily deliver a policy message, many environmental economists felt that the 
simplicity of the exercise did no justice to the hard work in the past decades by scholars to test 
the validity and reliability of nonmarket valuation and benefits transfer specifically. Critical 
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ecological economists considered it to be a grotesk example of benefits transfer by assuming that 
average value estimates from around 100 studies could simply be added and transferred through 
time and space, across different biomes and land uses, and groups of people and cultures.  
 
In 1997 we already knew, for example based on meta-analysis, that value estimates are not only 
a function of the good and service characteristics, but also the beneficiaries of the goods and 
services and differences in applied valuation methods. Meta-analysis is a statistical method to 
detect systematic variation in observed outcomes for example of wetland valuation studies, 
which produced the highest economic value flowsaccording to Costanza and colleagues.  
 
In Table 2 I present the results from three different meta-analyses conducted by three different 
groups of researchers, myself and others published in 1999 [7], Richard Woodward and Yong-
Suhk Wui from Texas A&M University published in 2001 [8], and my IVM colleagues Luke 
Brander and Jan Vermaat published some years later in 2006 [9].  
 
These meta-functions show the impacts of a variety of explanatory factors on the variation found 
in different wetland valuation studies. So, the dependent variable here is the wetland value. 
Based on improved understanding of what drives valuation results, the explanatory power of the 
models increases somewhat in time. However, especially the high R-square of Woodward’s 
model is striking based on the lowest number of observations. Although the numbers are not 
directly comparable, because they were measured in different units, there are four main points I 
want to make showing this table, which directly influence and at the same time undermine the 
validity and reliability of an exercise like the one published in Nature. 
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Table 2: Overview existing meta-analysis results for wetland ecosystem functions 
 
Source: Brander and Florax (2006). 
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First of all, the empirical evidence regarding the values of ecosystem services is mixed and this 
is probably due to the point I made earlier that our understanding of the link between ecosystem 
functioning and the provision of specific quantified ecosystem goods and services is still very 
limited. For instance, I found a significant impact of flood control, but this effect was not found 
in the other two studies which included a much more detailed list of ecosystem services. A lot of 
these more detailed services are hidden in the four categories I used. The fourth category in my 
study (not shown here) was the baseline category biodiversity. Brander and his colleagues show 
that ecosystem services with mainly direct use value are valued significantly less. In my own 
analysis the positive outcomes of the parameter estimates for flood control, water supply and 
water quality which have important direct use value to human beings too, indicate that these 
services are valued significantly higher than the biodiversity baseline category, which mainly 
consists of nonuse values. Nonuse values are values which are not directly related to any specific 
environmental use, but reflect the value people attach to the preservation of wildlife or conserve 
the environment for future generations. For instance, measured through donations we make to 
organizations like WWF and Greenpeace. So, more attention needs to be paid to linking 
ecosystem functions to ecosystem services and their specification to solve some of these 
apparently inconsistent findings in the literature. 
 
Second, there exists no such thing as a constant ecosystem service value per hectare or acre that 
can be transferred and aggregated unconditionally across the world. The estimated values are 
sensitive to the size of the wetland, that is, sensitive to scope, and display in the two studies 
where this was tested decreasing returns to scale. This is a basic economic law: economic values 
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are expected to decrease as scarcity increases and values diminish if there is more availableof a 
good or service. 
 
The third point I want to make is that not only size matters, also the number of people benefitting 
from the natural resource influence values. This is shown in the study by Brander et al. through 
the significant positive coefficient for population density. In my own study I measured wetland 
values per household per year to emphasize the fact that these values have to be aggregated 
across populations of beneficiaries, not merely biomes. Moreover, it is in most studies unclear if 
these values even have an underlying spatial dimension, which would allow us to express the 
values in a per hectare value. For example because of nonuse values. 
 
My final point is that it matters where these wetlands are found and related to that the overall 
welfare level of the people living there as shown by the impact of GDP per capita. What people 
pay or are willing to pay depends also on what they can afford to pay. 
 
So in conclusion, meta-analysis is a useful tool to summarize results from existing valuation 
studies and their application has increased substantially in the environmental valuation domain 
since the start of the 1990s. They were available for the global valuation exercise by Costanza 
and his colleagues. Far from perfect still, but nevertheless making those using valuation results in 
actual policy and decision-making aware of the pitfalls of simply transferring average point 
estimates, which is still common practice unfortunately in many if not most studies informing 
environmental policy based on environmental valuation of benefits.  
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3. Environmental damage assessment and liability 
I now turn to another important use of valuation results. In the US, contrary to Europe, 
nonmarket values are used in court, the most famous example being the court settlement with 
Exxon in the 1990s after the Exxon Valdez oil tanker disaster in Prince William Sound, Alaska, 
the largest oil spill in US history. Exxon was ordered to pay the State of Alaska 287 million 
dollars for actual damages and 2.5 billion dollars for punitive damages on top of the 2 billion 
already paid to clean up the spill. This was based on the 2.8 billion dollar estimate from Richard 
Carson and his colleagues [10], a well-known scholar in the field of environmental valuation at 
the University of California, for the loss of nonuse values as a result of the spill. This study 
evoked a lot of discussion and resulted in new guidelines, the so-called NOAA-guidelines [11], 
for the valuation of environmental damage, which were thoroughly tested and refined in 
subsequent years. 
 
In Europe, no cases are available yet where nonmarket valuation results are actually used in 
court. However, this may change as a result of the Environmental Liability Directive, which 
came into force in 2004 with the aim to prevent and remedy environmental damage, especially to 
habitats and species protected under European law. The Directive enforces the Polluter Pays 
Principle, making those responsible for environmental damage financially liable for 
environmental risks and actual environmental damage. 
 
The Environmental Liability Directive prescribes the use of resource-service equivalence 
approaches. However, ‘if it is not possible, alternative valuation techniques shall be used […] 
for example monetary valuation’ (Annex II, paragraph 1.2.3). In addition, natural resource 
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services are defined in the Directive as ‘the functions performed by a natural resource for the 
benefit of another natural resource or the public’ (Article 2(13) and paragraph 1(d) of Annex II). 
Hence, when developing remediation options, the loss of the services contributing to public well-
being should also be taken into account. This implies estimating the socio-economic value 
attached to the ecosystem services involved. For this, economic valuation methods may have to 
be used in view of the fact that existing habitat and resource equivalency methods do not include 
human welfare considerations. 
 
In 2008 I participated in a European research project aiming to illustrate the potential use and 
usefulness of such nonmarket values. Paid by the European Commission I revisited together with 
my colleagues Harry Aiking, an eco-toxicologist, and Julia Martin Ortega, an environmental 
scientist, one of the largest toxic spills in European history, namely the one near the Doñana 
National Park in South Spain in 1998. We assessed the welfare implications of the environmental 
damage there using nonmarket valuation methods.  
 
In April 1998, a dam of the pyrite mine owned by the Swedish-American company Boliden 
Apirsa in Aznalcóllar, 50 km north of the Doñana National Park, broke down and resulted in the 
release of 6 million cubic metres of toxic water and sludge into the Guadiamar river, a tributary 
of the Guadalquivir river. This contaminated material washed 40 km down the river, killing 
thousands of fish and birds, causing serious ecological damage. Most of the spill could be 
diverted away from the National Park by a series of quickly constructed dams outside the Park, 
home to many protected species including the Iberian lynx. Of the total area affected by the toxic 
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spill (4200 hectares) only 100 hectares were in the National Park. However, also around the park, 
the water provides an important breeding and feeding place for migratory birds.  
 
The company was fined almost 45 million dollars in 2002 by the Spanish Government, the 
largest fine ever issued by the Spanish government, including compensation for the ecological 
restoration costs. Just like Carson and his colleagues, we tried to assess the welfare loss of the 
environmental damage caused, only this time 10 years after the spill and at considerably lower 
cost than the million dollar budget they had. We examined taxpayers’ willingness to pay for 
additional nature protection measures to avoid the risk of a disaster like the 1998 spill from ever 
happening again. Our main objective was to test the suitability and reliability of available 
nonmarket valuation techniques for environmental damage assessment in the specific context of 
the Environmental Liability Directive. In doing so, we tried to follow as much as possible the 
NOAA guidelines.  
 
A bidding game was developed where people living at different distances from the toxic spill 
were asked a series of questions to elicit their willingness to pay. They were first asked whether 
they would be willing to pay a particular start bid, say 10 Euro and then depending on their reply 
to this start bid either a lower or higher follow-up bid. For example, if they said no to the 10 
Euro, they were then asked if they would be willing to pay 5 Euro. If they said yes to the 10 
Euro, they were asked if they were also willing to pay 15 Euro. In this way we are able to 
establish the interval in which public willingness to pay falls. One of the pitfalls of the approach 
is that the follow-up bids may depend on the start bid and this has to be accounted for in the 
estimated choice model.  
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Estimating the model, we found an average willingness to pay of 3 and a half Euro per household 
per year over and above their current income tax, which is very small for an average disposable 
household income of around 1600 Euro per month. Aggregated across the population of direct 
beneficiaries in Andalucia, this comes to a total economic value per year of 17 million euro or 27 
million dollar in 2008 prices. This is less than the fine imposed by the Spanish government. But, 
note that we estimated an annual flow value, whereas the fine is a one-time off payment. 
Moreover, the value we estimated is only aggregated across the population of Andalucia where 
we conducted the study. The Doñana National Park is the biggest RAMSAR wetland in Europe, 
and hence one could argue with much wider than just local or regional benefits. 
 
In our report we concluded that the use of nonmarket valuation approaches in the context of 
environmental liability and damage assessment is not problem-free. One of the most important 
methodological issues is related to the polluter pays principle and public perception of property 
rights and legal entitlements to environmental goods and services. Like Carson in the US, we too 
found that a considerable share of the population, some 18 percent, refused to contribute 
financially to the prevention of environmental damage because the polluter should pay. Hence 
the reason why we estimated a selection model to account for protest response. Carson and his 
colleagues took a year pretesting their valuation design, we had to do it in 3 months given our 
financial resource constraints. In both cases it appeared impossible to get rid of persistent protest. 
 
In those cases where the polluter is publicly known and the pollution is big news, like Exxon in 
the 1989 oil spill and Boliden Apirsa in the case of the Doñana, is it likely that fingers will be 
pointed first of all at the polluters. This limits the usefulness of stated preference methods for 
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nonmarket valuation ex post, that is after the event. In those cases, one could try to reach an 
agreement beforehand on the height of the fines discouraging particular activities and risks near 
important natural resources. This could still be based on nonmarket valuation, besides traditional 
command and control instruments and the application of so-called habitat and resource 
equivalency methods to restore and compensate environmental damage and corresponding costs. 
 
4. Payments for water services 
Despite the absence of markets and prices for many ecosystem services, it is in some cases an 
observable fact that they have value and that they are assigned financial and economic values in 
policy and decision-making processes. Farmers get, for example, compensated for agricultural 
wildlife management. These compensations were introduced in the Netherlands after adoption of 
the so-called Relatienota in 1975, to account for the negative externalities of modern-day 
agriculture and encourage the production of positive externalities such as biodiversity and 
landscape amenities. Under the umbrella of the European Common Agricultural Policy, other 
European Member States such as the UK, Belgium, France, Italy, Ireland and Finland have 
introduced a wide variety of agri-environmental schemes to comply with European legislation 
such as Natura 2000 and the Rural Development Regulation. 
 
The development of the area of land falling under agri-environmental schemes where farmers are 
compensated for wildlife and landscape management has increased in the Netherlands from 16 
thousand hectares in 1990 to almost 78 thousand hectares in 2007. The objective is to have 118 
thousand hectares of land designated as agricultural nature subject to agri-environmental 
schemes by 2018 as part of the so-called Dutch Ecological Structure (Ecologische 
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Hoofdstructuur). This sounds like a lot, but is in fact only between 5 to 10 percent of all 
agricultural land in the Netherlands. Currently around 65 percent of these 118 thousand hectares 
have been realized and it is unlikely that the objective will be met in 2018. Farmers are 
compensated for their wildlife and landscape management under the SAN subsidy: 
Subsidieregeling Agrarisch Natuurbeheer. Different prices are paid for different activities 
performed by farmers on their land. When examining the development of these prices in time 
(Figure 1), the unit prices for the provision of certain ecosystem services have risen considerably 
since 2007, possibly as a result of the delay in achieving the 2018 objectives and encourage 
farmer participation.  
 
Figure 1: Development of prices for ecosystem services provision on agricultural land 
 
Source: own adaptation based on LNV (2009). 
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The compensation price levels are based on actual labor costs and production losses and, 
depending on the exact activity, a mark-up between zero and twenty percent to encourage farmer 
participation. Some programs are well-known with the wider public, for instance to protect rare 
meadow birds like the black-tailed godwit. In some provinces farmers get paid for every nest 
found on their land.  
 
Agri-environmental agreements may also play an important role in water policy. The agricultural 
sector is the largest water consumer in the world and also one of the most important emitters of 
nutrients in surface and ground water. Existing agri-environmental schemes can be used at low 
transaction costs given their long implementation history and institutional embedding across 
European Member States to stimulate the reduction of pesticide and nutrient emissions to water. 
This would provide an important step forwards to reach the environmental objectives laid down 
in the European Water Framework Directive adopted in 2000. The Water Framework Directive 
is a huge piece of new water legislation prescribing that all surface and groundwater in European 
Member States should be in a good state by 2015.  
 
The Water Framework Directive provides an important stepping stone towards payments for 
water services on the basis of which farmers can, for example, be compensated for their water 
quality improvement activities on their land. The Directive essentially embraces the co-
evolutionary ecosystems approach advocated since the 1960s in academia by scholars like Buzz 
Holling. A first key characteristic is that the Directive is implemented at river basin level, that is, 
the hydro-geographical boundaries of the water system, not existing administrative boundaries 
which usually stop at the border of a country. This poses a real challenge as it increases both the 
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complexity and uncertainty of European water management. Related to this is the emphasis on 
both water chemistry and ecology, and here too important challenges have surfaced in past years, 
trying to establish reliable cause-effect relationships in the aquatic ecosystem.  
 
A second key characteristic is that the Water Framework Directive is the first water directive in 
Europe in which economics plays such an important role and is an integral part of the river basin 
analysis. A means to an end to reach the environmental objectives of the Directive through the 
adoption of economic principles such as the polluter pays principle, economic methods like cost-
effectiveness analysis (meaning that the objectives have to be reached at lowest cost possible) 
and economic instruments such as water pricing.  
 
Water pricing is one of the Directive’s most important innovations. The WFD refers to pricing in 
relation to water services in article 9. Adequate water pricing acts as an incentive for the 
sustainable use of water resources. However, if one looks at the definition of water services in 
the WFD, the interpretation is very narrow, and mainly refers to drinking water, wastewater 
collection and treatment. As far as I understand (I could not find any details anywhere) the 
European Commission has been taken to court over this definition issue by WWF, who also 
disagrees with the narrow interpretation of water services by most EU Member States in their 
draft river basin management plans submitted to the European Commission in 2009.  
 
The implication of labeling a specific activity as a water service is that a pricing mechanism has 
to be in place for the recovery of the costs of the water service provided. In most EU Member 
States people already pay for drinking water provided by drinking water companies and often 
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also for wastewater collection and treatment performed by public utilities. Maybe not the full 
costs of the service, including the environmental and resource costs involved, but usually a 
considerable share of it. Hence, defining water services in a narrow sense as drinking water 
provision and wastewater treatment is a safe bet of not having to introduce new and perhaps 
undesirable pricing mechanisms. It is understandable that there is resistance to pricing access to 
water services which have historically and traditionally always been ‘free of charge’. Take water 
for irrigated agriculture, but also water use in industry and perhaps even navigation and 
hydropower. However, here tremendous opportunities are found to introduce more market-based 
incentives to change the way we use our water resources and engage with our water 
environment. 
 
I am convinced that interpreting water services in a broader sense than currently is the case will 
be beneficial in the long term to achieve more sustainable levels of water use. Expressing 
nonmarket ecosystem goods and services in monetary terms – as long as we do this in a sound 
and robust way – provides an important signal to policymakers that our natural environment has 
a value and that using it in an unsustainable way comes at a cost. Money speaks louder than 
words, especially when dealing with companies whose business it is to make money. Introducing 
financial incentives to change the way they operate and use the environment as if the ecosystem 
services it provides are free of charge can be an important complementary policy to traditional 
command and control to change people’s behavior. For example, making companies pay for 
permits issued by the government to pollute and allow some degree of market functioning where 
these permits can be traded to stimulate more efficient water use. In the Netherlands the 
government issues water pollution permits since the 1970s for which companies have to pay. 
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This happens under the Surface Water Pollution Act, now part of the new Dutch Water Law. 
However, there exists no possibility to trade these permits within the limits imposed by the 
government. This is what I mean in the title of my presentation with making money talk. Let 
money do the talking within the environmental boundaries imposed based on safe minimum 
standards or precautionary principles. With the help of a general equilibrium model, I have been 
able to show together with other colleagues at IVM that such a market system may have a 
moderating effect on the costs of implementation of the Water Framework Directive [12]. 
 
Water pricing too often is dismissed in policy and decision-making on incorrect grounds in my 
view, namely that water use is non-responsive to water pricing, an important point made also by 
John Briscoe in his contribution to the book ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis and Water Resources 
Management’ which I edited together with the late David Pearce [13]. Water allocation and 
water pollution rights are very much dominated by traditional technical standards and 
engineering solutions. We have a much better understanding already of the values underlying 
water services. One has to be careful to use some of these ball-park estimates to fix price levels, 
but if you look closer, some remarkably consistent results are found with important policy 
implications. 
 
First of all, the value of water for many low value crops is universally low. When used for high-
value crops, the value of water can be much higher, sometimes in the order of magnitude to the 
value of water in domestic and industrial uses. The value of water for domestic use is, not 
surprisingly, always highest, whereas the value for environmental purposes such as 
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environmental flows, maintenance of wetlands, wildlife habitat vary widely, but typically fall in 
between the agricultural and domestic values. 
 
Similar remarkably consistent results are found when examining available data on price 
elasticities (Figure 2). Price elasticities tell us how water users react to a change in the price of 
water, measured as the percentage change in water use for each percentage increase in the price 
of water. If the elasticity is zero, demand is said to be perfectly inelastic. It does not respond to a 
change in the water price. If the elasticity is between zero and -1, demand is said to be inelastic. 
The percentage change in water use is less than the percentage change in the price. Finally, if the 
elasticity is lower than -1, demand is said to be elastic. The percentage change in water use is 
higher than the percentage change in the water price. 
 
Figure 2: Range of price elasticities of water demand in the United States 
 
 
Source: Briscoe (2005). 
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The use of the word inelastic has caused some confusion as it is interpreted by some that water 
use is not reduced when the price increases. Residential water use is usually least sensitive to 
price changes because it is a basic need, followed by industrial water use, where water often is a 
necessary non-substitutable input in a production process. Take the production of beer, paper or 
textile. This cannot happen without water. On the other hand, for recreational activities the 
response to changing park entry fees, prices of hunting or fishing permits are usually more 
elastic. 
 
The most important conclusion here is first of all that the price elasticity is negative. This means 
that water users do react to water pricing by reducing their demand if the price increases. It is 
often a misunderstanding that an inelastic demand for water means that water use is completely 
unresponsive to changes in water prices. The second important point is that the elasticity is 
higher if the price is higher. If users are already charged a high price for their water use, they will 
be much more responsive to an increase in the water price than if they are charged a low price. 
There is one important sector missing in Figure 2. Agriculture is not included. Price levels in 
agriculture are typically low and hence studies investigating the elasticity of irrigation water 
demand therefore usually find, not surprisingly, low elasticities. So, the reason for this low 
elasticity is usually not that farmers do not respond to prices, but because the response depends 
on the baseline level of the water price. 
 
5. Future research directions 
At the end of my presentation I’d also like to say a few words about future research directions 
and the ambitions I have with this new chair in the department of environmental economics. I see 
26 

a number of important new research directions. These are related to the further development of 
so-called choice experiments, and their role in (1) facilitating improved understanding of the 
specific goods and services provided by ecosystems, and (2) informing the design of economic 
instruments like payments for ecosystem services. The increased use of choice experiments will 
be accompanied by further in-depth testing of economic valuation processes underlying value 
outcomes. Choice experiments work on the interface between economics and socio-psychology. 
We need to get a better understanding of choice processes. This will help us to better assess the 
robustness and reliability of the value outcomes, and hence their acceptability in actual policy 
and decision-making. 
 
So, a lot of emphasis on choice experiments. We made enormous advancements and gained a lot 
of experience in the department over the past 5 years with choice experiments. These 
experiments were introduced about 10 years ago at the end of the 1990s into the environmental 
valuation domain and have made a significant contribution to the improvement of the validity 
and reliability of economic valuation. Most importantly to get rid of and/or better account for 
some of the flaws that troubled the other stated preference method contingent valuation. This 
includes for example preference construction, scope sensitivity, embedding, and trade-offs 
between substitutes. In the department of environmental economics I aim to provide a significant 
contribution to the further development of these choice experiments and the published literature 
in this area. Choice experiments allow for much more detail in the description of the baseline and 
policy conditions in environmental valuation. And it is this quality that makes choice 
experiments especially suitable for the assessment of payments for ecosystem services. 
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Together with Marije Schaafsma, one of the PhD researchers in the institute over the past 4 
years, and Alison Gilbert, one of the ecologists in IVM, I have been working towards an 
improved natural scientific representation and break-down of individual ecosystem services in 
choice experiments, focusing especially on the substitutability between individual services 
provided at specific water locations, such as bathing and nature conservation. We tested this for 
example in the Scheldt basin, at three specific locations in one and the same confined 
geographical area. Locals pay for some of the water services already through their water board 
tax. The environmental objectives of the Water Framework Directive relating to the area’s 
hydro-morphology, chemical and ecological status were translated in specific water services. 
 
The PhD work, which is close to finished, has provided us with useful new insights and building 
blocks for future research. I want to mention two important findings here. The first one is that 
water services and their socio-economic values are site-specific. The relevance of this is that this 
site-specific context has to be accounted for in the valuation research design and when 
aggregating values from individual water bodies into a total economic value of a river basin. A 
second important finding is that despite the specific context, adding to the uniqueness of some of 
these sites and services, both sites and services are substitutable. The choice experiment allowed 
us to explicitly test the degree of substitution. This is a function of the specific ecosystem 
services characteristics, but also the spatial distribution of the population of beneficiaries of these 
services. We show that if the water management authority in the study area, Rijkswaterstaat 
Zeeland, improves water quality at one site, this has consequences for the economic values of 
water services provided at other sites. Knowing these substitution patterns, we get a much better 
understanding of the interrelationships between individual water bodies in a river basin. This in 
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turn allows us to better advise policymakers on how to prioritize public investments in water 
quality improvements. 
 
Another line of research is closely related to this, namely building spatial value maps, accounting 
for the factors that influence nonmarket values for ecosystem services. This work was initiated in 
the department of Environmental Economics by Luke Brander about 2 years ago, first for the 
European Environment Agency, then AQUAMONEY and now for example also for TEEB, The 
Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity. TEEB is a major international initiative to draw 
attention to the global economic benefits of biodiversity, funded by the European Commission, 
UNEP and so on. The GIS work in this research area is carried out by our GIS expert Alfred 
Wagtendonk. In the example shown in Figure 3 we first translated available European-wide 
water monitoring data to water quality levels and the different ecosystem services provided at 
these different levels using meta-analysis. Changing water quality levels affects the values of 
these ecosystem services. We relate these changes to population characteristics, which we know 
influence the values attached to water quality changes like income levels, but also relative 
ecosystem service scarcity and the distance people live away from water. This latter effect is 
called distance-decay, and is closely related to substitution effects. For specific water uses like 
recreational fishing or bathing, the further away someone lives from a water site, the less that 
person might worry about and hence value changes in water quality levels, but also the more 
substitution possibilities become available. And this then translates in the end into value maps 
where changes in water quality levels are measured in economic terms. Because this is all done 
in GIS, one can zoom into a specific area and look for regional or even local value changes. 
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Figure 3: Example of a GIS based value map for water quality changes 
 
Source: Wagtendonk, Brander and Brouwer (2009). 
 
The use of choice experiments to inform the institutional-economic design of Payments for 
Ecosystem Services schemes is a research direction I developed recently in the research program  
Poverty Reduction and Environmental Management (PREM) funded by the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and coordinated by my colleague Pieter van Beukering. In PREM I explored for 
example the design of micro crop insurance to protect farmers in Bangladesh against the impacts 
of climate change and increasing flood risks [14]. In a new project in Ethiopia and Sudan I test  
together with Abonesh Tesfaye and Pieter van der Zaag from UNESCO-IHE how we can add in 
private interests in public-private partnerships using financial and economic incentives to change 
farmer behavior to use their land in a more sustainable way. Every year tons of soil erode and 
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wash into the Blue Nile causing enormous constipation downstream in Sudan. The governments 
in Ethiopia and Sudan have public interests to safeguard the water services provided by the Blue 
Nile. At the same time farmers have a private interest in maintaining soil quality. Instead of 
doing what almost every Payment for Ecosystem Service scheme in the world does, that is 
compensating farmers for less intense land use and set-aside, we aim to introduce private 
incentives into contractual agreements between government and farmers. Farmers are not 
compensated financially, but given for example certain land use guarantees, extension services 
and credit facilities to take soil conservation measures on their land, for which they pay 
themselves. First field trials using choice experiments to test participation and incentive-
compatibility constraints indicate that this seems to work.  
 
Finally, it is an illusion to think that economic instruments like Payments for Ecosystem Services 
are the holy grail to solve the serious environmental problems we face worldwide. They will 
have to be part of a wider policy package and embedded in an institutional-economic context. 
The hypothesis is that economic instruments will be more effective and can be introduced at 
lower transaction costs when part of a broader package of policy instruments. Together with my 
colleagues at IVM I will take this hypothesis to the test in the coming years, focusing on 
payments for ecosystem services in a wider ecosystem governance context.  
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